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on the Draft Banking Act 
for the Associated States and Montserrat 
This note vvas prepared in response to a request froj: ane 
r.f the Associated States by May of comnents ana su/rge st ic la 
on the Second Draft of the Banking Act 1971 for the 
States and Montserrat. In view of the fact that these 
coKUTlents would be of interest to the oth-r Associated St:' + es 
and Montserrat, it is being circulated to ail the Governments 
concerned. 
1, GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
2. There can be no gain-saj-'ing that banFcing business in each 
territory should be governed by legislation \;hicb is designed not 
only to protect the interests of the depositors but also to serve 
the broader national objectives of monetary and economic policies. 
This holds good regardless of whether the banking business is in 
foreign or domestic hands. In actual fact, the banking business 
in these territories is entirely in foreign hands» 
3. Nor can there be any question about the desirability of a 
uniform banking legislation among the East Caribbean Associated 
States and Montserrat who are all members of East Caribbean Common 
Market and are, as such, committed to "the co-ordination of currency 
and financial policies"» 
4„ Under the ECCM Agreement, the Council of Ministers is obliged 
to "keep under reviev/ the monetary and financial situation of 
individual Member States as well as the general payments system 
of Member States as a group", 
5<. All the ECCM Member States are, together with Barbados, parties 
to the arrangement for a comsaon currency authority, viz, East 
Caribbean Currency Authority, hereafter referred to as ECCA. Thus, 
the same currency circulates v̂ rithin the ECCM as a group» 
6» But currency in circuiation is only one, though important^ 
constituent pf money supply. The other equally important 
coristituent of money supply,comprises of bank deposits, 
7. The enactment of a uniform banking legislation by the ECCM 
Member J States could ensure effective co-ordination of policies 
with regaled, to the total money supply including bank deposits 
within, as well as among, the Member States, ;. • 
8. Ordinarilj':, the functions of supervising and regulating j 
banking business are entrusted to the Central Bank. But the 
..Ê ast Caribbean situation is somewhat peculiar in tha4i 
a) the Member States participating in the Common 
Currency arrangement are entitled to, and do 
pursue independent economic policies; 
t) one Member State, namely Barbados, is not even 
a party to the Common Market agreement^ which 
enjoins on its Member States common policies in 
certain specified economic fields. 
9. In the circumatances, the Central Banking role of the ECpÁ 
~ c'̂ nncrt-~-'be"as -comprehensive as that of an ordinary Central Bank. 
Some of the Central Banking functions would be best taken over 
by the respective Ministers of Finance within each territory ' 
even though they are performed within the framework of a uniform 
1 egialation. Still the ECCA may have to be entrusted w'ith certain 
functions over and above those covered by the present agreement 
under which it was set uj). sv 
10. It is in the light of these general observations that 
comments and suggestions are offered on the proposed banking 
legislation in the following two parts of this Note, First are 
offered comáents and suggestions on matters ofsubstance and 
next are offered some comraents and suggestions for the redrafting 
of, some of the provisions of the proposed legislation. 
„ 3 . 
II. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 
llo The order followed in this and the suhsequent sections óí 
this Note is the same as that of the proposed legislation under 
review. 
Licencing 
12. In almost all the territories, banks are required to take 
a licence but the licence fees payable annually vary from 
territory to territory. But it should be noted that the require-
ment to take a licence before a person or company undertakes the 
business of banking is a type of registration requirement and 
the licence fee payable is on par with the registration fee as 
a payment for franchise. The licence fee is not really in the 
nature of a tax. In any case, this licence fee could never 
become a major source of revenue for the Government of any 
territory. 
13» As a source of revenue, the licence fee will have t o be 
fixed at very high levels, levels that do not exist anywhere 
in this region,, As a payment for franchise, it can be set 
at a relatix^ely moderate level, which, even if different from 
territory to territory, would not make much of a difference. 
Distinction between "bankifag business" and "credit 
institution business" 
14. The proposed legislation seeks to draw this distinction 
on the basis of the nature of deposits accepted. Those 
carrying on the former accept deposits "payable on demand or 
after a fixed period or after notice and which are withdrawable 
by cheque, draft or order" whereas the latter accept only 
deposits "repayable after a fixed period or after notice". 
15. Having drawn this distinction, however, the rest of the 
proposed legislation applies in the same manner to both types 
of business. Take for instance the provision with respect 
to 'trade investments and immovable property'. A credit 
institution will, because of the very nature of the deposits 
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it accepts, tend more to invest long than short whereas a bank 
would want to do exactly the opposite. But the restrictions 
proposed on long term investments seem to apply equally to credit 
institutions as to banks. Unless it is the express purpose of the 
proposed legislation to discourage credit institution business, 
restrictions on long-term investments by credit institutions will 
have to be considerably relaxed. In any event, a main weakness in ^ 
the region is lack of medium and long-term credit and it could 
therefore be argued that even the banks should not be subjected to 
unduly strict controls with respect to local investments, particularly 
of the medium-term variety. 
Minimum Capital Requirements 
16. The proposed legislation proposes certain minimum capital re-
quirements. Two interesting aspects of the provisions made in the 
legislation are: 
i) that the minimum paid-up capital, as stipulated, is 
"invested in such assets as the Minister may approve" 
and 
ii) that where the bank is incorporated and/or controlled 
abroad, the minimum paid-up capital requirement,is set 
ai of its total deposit liabilities in the territory 
if it is higher than the absolute minimum prescribed 
for the bank incorporated or controlled within the 
territory. 
17* It is common practice to prescribe minimnm capital requirement 
for a bank. In the context of the East Caribbean, it is also 
appropriate that a distinction has been drawn, for the purposes of 
capital requirement, between a domestic bank and a foreign bank. 
At present, comuercial banking in the East Caribbean is entirely 
in the hands of large foreign banks. For these large foreign 
banks, any local minimum paid-up capital requirements as such is 
unlikely to pose any particular problem. Even the somewhat novel 
requirement that banks must invest their minimum paid-up capital 
in "approved" assets is unlikely to pose much of a problem by 
itself for the foreign banks, especially when one considers that 
over 50^ of the assets of these banks are held abroad for them 
to repatriate one-tenth of these. 
•5l> 
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18. But if the objective were to promote the evolution of 
genuinely local banks, not only would the minimum capital 
requirements have to be set very realistically but also would 
the requirement for the investment of such capital in "approved" 
assets have to be relaxed because the latter could be extremely 
onerous to fulfil for any local bank, particularly in its first 
i few formative years» 
19. With respect to minimum capital requirements, it might 
be worthwhile considering if, as is already done in Barbados, 
a much lower absolute is prescribed for banks incorporated 
and controlled locally than for banks incorporated or con-
trolled abroad. For this purpose, it is felt, the banks 
incorporated and controlled vv'ithin the territories, singly or 
jointly, should be regarded as locally incorporated and con-
trolledo 
20. Also, if the objective of requiring investment of the 
paid-up capital of the bank in "approved" local assets is to 
secure an increase in the banks' local assets, it might well 
be asked if this could not be secured through more direct and 
well-recognised methods. This question is taken up a little 
later in this Note. 
Reserve Fund 
0 
21. The proposed provision requires the bank or credit 
institution to maintain a reserve fund and to transfer not 
less than 25^ of its net profits before paj'̂ ment of dividend 
each year to this fund until the fund equals its paid-up 
capital» Where, however, the bank or credit institution is 
incorporated abroad, the transfer to reserve fund has to be 
made at the rate of 25^ of net profits, before deduction of 
head office expenses and remittance of profits, until the 
reserve fund equals of the deposit liabilities of the 
bank or institution, or the minimum paid-up capital require-
ment set for domestic banks, whichevei' is higher. 
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22. This again is a very desirable provision and is in accord 
wit.h the standard banking practice. Table I below presents a 
comparison of the yearly transfer required by law to the Reserve 
Fund in the rest of the Commonwealth Caribbeans 
Table 1: Comparative Ratio of obligatory 
transfer of net profits to Reserve 
Fund ^ 




15% 10^ 10^ 25^ 
23. It will be seen from the above table that the proposed 
legislation seeks a larger annual transfer to the Reserve Fund 
than obtains in the larger CARIFTA territories. As a consequence, 
the locally controlled, banks and credit institutions would have 
to build up their Reserve Fund faster in the Associated States 
than if they were functioning in the larger territories. As far 
as the foreign banks and credit institutions are concerned, since 
they have to relate their Reserve Funds to their deposit 
liabilities, the transfers from profits may have to continue so 
long as their deposits are expanding, 
24. It is for consideration whether in regard to the transfer of 
a part of profits to the Reserve Fund, the interests of the 
depositors would not be better served if the locally controlled 
banks and credit institutions are also required to relate their 
Reserve Funds to their deposit liabilities. Possibly, the rate 
of annual transfer could then be scaled down from 25% to, say, 
15^ as in Guyanii. 
Reserve, and Liquidity Ratios 
25. The proposed legislation .prescribes certain cash reserve 
and liquidity ratios. These ratios are meant primarily to be 
used as levers which the Central Banks are known to use with a 
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vitív; to controlling and regulating expansion of bank credit. 
There is no reason whatsoever why the authorities in the East 
Caribbean should deny to themselves the use of these important 
levers of monetary policy» The proposed legislation sets down 
ratios for both cash reserve and liquidity» 
26» Table II below compares the proposed ratios with those 
obtaining in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago:-
Table H i Comparative Cash Heserve and 
Liquidity Hutios to Liabilities 






























27. The requirement that the bauks should hold cash reserve balances 
with the ECCA raises a serious problem. Under the ECCA Agreement, the 
Authority is required to hold against its liabilities, including demand 
liabilities, at least 70^ of its assets abroad. Since the cash reserve 
balances with the Authority will increase its demand liabilities, the 
Authority will have to correspondingly increase its,investments abroad. 
Of course, this assumes that the Authority's present,holdings abroad 
do not exceed 70^ of its liabilities. Actually, the Authority's 
present holdings abroad amount to oyer 90f<> of its 1 iabilities But 
the problem would at once emerge if the Authority were, as it should, 
to increase the proportion of its local assets, 
28. The proposed legislation prescribes the same liquidity ratios for 
banks and credit institutions. In view of the fact that the nature of 
business undertaken by these two types of institutions will be quite 
different, it could be argued, not without some justification, that 
the same liquidity ratios might operate somewhat harshly on the credit 
institutions. It is for consideration, therefore, if lower ratios 
should be fixed for credit institutions than for banks. 
29. With respect to the assets to be treated as liquid under the 
proposed legislation, they are to include not only the cash reserve 
balances and local notes and coins held but also i) net balances 
and other" moneys at call with banks in the territoryi ii) treasury 
bills, maturing within 93 days, of participating govennments; 
iii) securities maturing in 5 years of participating governments; 
iv) securities maturing in 5 years of the Caribbean Development Bank; 
v) securities maturing in 5 years of the other Commonwealth Caribbean 
Governments and vi) commercial bills and promisory notes eligible 
for discount with the ECCA. 
30. Firstly, there appears to be no particular reason why the period 
of maturity should at all be stated with respect to treasury bills. 
This will leave room for the Govérnments to issue treasury bills with 
maturity longer than 93 days^if circumstances so demand, as against 
Government securities maturing in 5 years. In this connection, it 
must be stated, however, that under the existing East Caribbean 
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Currency Agreement the treasury bills are defined as those 
maturing within 93 days for ¡urposes of investment by the 
Currency Authority although, at the same time, the Authority 
is authorised by that Agreement to invest in securities 
maturing in not more than 17 years. There appears to be 
no particular reason why for purposes of determining the 
liquidity position of banks and credit institutions, the 
definition of treasury bilis in the proposed banking 
legislation has to accord with that of the Currency Agreement. 
In fact, as is evicent, the maturity condition p.. o];osed for 
Government securities cioetj not accord ./itli that in the Currency 
Agreement. 
31= Secondly, the maturity condition for Government securities 
in the proposed legislation appears to be restrictive. If the 
purpose is to encourage hanks and credit institutions to 
invest more funds in the securities of the Governments of the 
participating territories where, c.t their present stage of 
developmont, Governments Lii'!;lit rc, t.ire moî t o:f their funds 
for longer periods it uight be more helpful to the develo[:ment 
process to raise the maturity condition for b^nks to betv/een 
7 to 10 years and for credit institutions to between 10 and 
15 years. 
32. Thirdly, the proposed treatment of the Government 
securities of not only the participating territories other 
than the territory in which the bank is operating but also 
the non-participating Commonwealth Caribbean countries as 
liquid assets for the territory in question is no doubt 
extremely well moti\ated. But care will have to be taken 
to ensure (a) that this does not cause an unduly large outflow 
of funds from this group of territories to the more developed 
Commonwealth Caribbean (in fact the movement of funds should, 
if anything, be in the reverse direction but this particular 
provision is unlikely to promote this reverse movement of 
funds) and (b) that even within the territories participating 
in this uniform banking arrangements there is a broadly even 
distribution, taking one year with the other. 
35. In this connection, a reference is invited to the provision 
in the Trinidad and Tobago Central Bank Act, whereby the Central 
Bank "may, by notice published in Gazette, determine the minimum ratio 
that after the expiration of six months from the date of service of the 
notice, Trinidad and Tobago assets held by the commercial banks will 
bear to their respective liabilities in Trinidad and Tobago; but 
any variation of such ratio shall not exceed ten percentage points 
in any one period of six months". 
36. A provision on the above lines should, it is felt, be made in 
the proposed banking legislation and the powers to determine the local 
asset ratio from time to time should rest with the respective Ministers 




33. As things stand today, the ratio of the local assets of the 
banks iti the Leeward and Windward Islands to their total liabilities 
works out to less than 50^, The difference i.e. of over 50^, is 
more or less automatically held as credit with the respective Head 
Offices of the concerned banks. Thus the commercial banks in these 
islands operate, to all intents and purposes, as channels for the 
net transfer of funds to, rather than from, developed metropolises. 
This is by no means a very satisfactory situation and it cannot be 
allowed to continue.' 
3't. It is important to make a provision in the proposed legislation 
whereby the banks and credit institutions can be required to invest 
a larger and larger proportion of their deposit liabilities in the 
form of local assets, preferably within each territory. To achieve 
this objective, it will be desirable to give the banks and credit 
institutions reasonable time to achieve whatever is the targeted 
ratio of local assets to their deposit liabilities. Not only that, 
the Governments of the territories may, within their respective 
jurisdictions or even collectively, have to go a step further and 
actually provide, as an interim measure though, appropriate outlets 
in the form of securities of varying maturities in the absence of 
appropriate local investments. 
¡ni 
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Selective Credit Control 
37" Closely connected with the power to require hanks and credit 
institutions to hold a minimum proportion of assets locally against 
their local liabilities, is the power either to direct the flow 
of bank credit to areas or sectors of the economy which call for 
higher priority in terms of national development orto deflect the 
flow of credit from areas where expansion is considered undesirable, 
or less desirable than in other areas. 
38. It is felt that the provision in the proposed legislation 
dealing with selective credit controls needs being strengthened. 
In Trinidad and Tobago, the Central Bank has been given the power 
to impose, if necessary, "controls in respect of the volume, terms 
and conditions upon which credit may be made available to all or 
any sectors of the economy, where in its judgement, the imposition 
of such controls is necessary to restrict or prevent an undue 
expansion of credit". 
39- A provision on the above lines in the proposed banking 
legislation empowering the Minister of Finance in each Territory 
to impose control on the flow of credit to various sectors 
would help the Governments ensure that bank credit expansion, or 
contraction, takes place in line with the overall economic and 
developmental policies which the Government is pursuing or wishes 
to pursue. 
Foreign Working Balances 
40. The proposed legislation makes a provision with respect 
to the working balances which banks and credit institutions 
may hold in foreign currencies. This is a very necessary 
provision. Also, it rightly confers the power to regulate the 
holdings of foreign currencies to the Minister of Finance in 
each territory but this should, it is felt, be supplemented by 
a provision requiring co-ordination of action between the 
participating territories in the exercise of this power^, 
3 
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III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REDRAFTING 
Sec^tion 2; 
41. In the definition of the 'bank' and 'credit institution', the 
words 'any person undertaking or' should be deleted, because Section 
5 says that "no person shall be granted or hold a licence under this 
Act unless he is a company Even otherwise, it is 
desirable that onlj'- companies should be allowed to transact this f) 
type of business. 
42. It is presumed that the definition suggested for "company" 
namely "or company registered under the Companies Act of the Territory'' 
will include a company incorporated and/or controlled outside of the 
territory provided it registers itself in the territory. 
43. In the definition of "banking business" and "credit institution 
business", the words "for the account and at the risk of the person 
accepting suchdeposits" seemto be unnecessary and could be omitted. 
44. In the definition of "time liabilities", the words "and includes 
saving deposits" be added at the end. This is necessary to bring it 
in line with the definition of "time deposits". 
Section 4: 
45. In view of what has been suggested above, the word ."person" 
will have to be replaced by the word "company" in this and subsequent 
sections. 
46. It is suggested that a sub-section be added, possibly on the ^ 
lines of Trinidad and Tobago legislation, requiring the application (, 
for licence to be accompanied by information such as: 
i) a statement giving the names and addresses of the 
directors and their principal and other business 
interests; 
ii) authorised and paid-up capital; 
iii) certified copies of the memorandum and articles of 
association and other instruments of incorporation; 
iv) audited and certified copy of the latest balance sheet 
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v) and such further information as the Authorit/ and/or 
the Minister may require. 
Section 5°' 
47= In subsection (2) (a), the words "and invested in such 
assets as the Minister maj- approve" may bo delated. This may 
opei'ate as too onerous a provision for a new domestic banking 
* enterprise to complj^ with„ 
^ 48. In subsection (2) (b), the paid-uij capilal requirement 
might be put at a sum much higher than for domestic companies. 
49. Clause (ii) of subsection (2) (b) will have to be deleted 
if, subsection (2) (a) is amended as suggested above. 
Section 6; 
50„ As the provision reads, the cash reserve requirement 
applies to only banks and not to credit institutions. The 
latter are subject to only the liquidity requirements, under 
Section 7s whereas banks are to fulfil both cash reserve as 
v/ell as liquidity requirements, 
51= The requirement, however, that these cash reserve 
balances should be held with the Currency Authority raises 
the problem that the Authority will, under the present 
Agreement, in turn have to invest lOfc of these balances abroad. 
It is for consideration if, in the circumstances, the pro-
posed cash reserve requirement be not replaced by a requirement 
to hold the treasury bills of the territory concerned, at 
least until such time as the Currency Agreement is appropriately 
modified. 
Section 7s 
52, A subsection should be added whereby the Minister can 
fix different liquid asset ratio for credit institutions as 
against banks. Also, another subsection be added whereby the 
Minister can add to, or modify, the list of 'liquid assets' 
and can even determine, if considered necessary, a list 
different for banks than for credit institutions» 
< 
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53. In subsection (l), the words "on the average" are not enough, 
If they mean taking a monthly average, it is suggested that the 
following words be added: "taking one month with the other". 
In the interests of clarity, subsection 6(c) should be 
modified to read as t 
"balances and other moneys at call with 
any other bank in the Territory after 
deducting therefrom balances and moneys 
at call owed to any other bank in the 
Territory". 
55. In subsection 6(d), the words "within a period not exceeding 
ninety-three days" be deleted. 
5 6 . Subsection 6(e), should be appropriately amended to allow 
longer maturities, separately for banks and credit institutions. 
57- Subsection 6(g) might well be deleted altogether to avoid 
the outflow of funds to more developed CARIFTA territories. 
58. Subsection 8 might have to be suitably modified to give the 
ultimate discretion to the Minister in taking his decisions under 
this section. 
Section 8: 
59. In subsection (l), the words "and controlled" be added 
after "incorporated". 
6 0 . In subsection ( 2 ) , the words "and/or controlled" should be 
added after "incorporated" and before "outside the^ Territorx'^. 
6 1 . In both the above subsections, the words "after payment of 
income and/or corporation tax" should be added after "net profits" 
to clarify that the required transfer obligations applies to 
profits after tax. 
6 2 . If the suggestion made in Part II of this Note with respect 
to relating accumulation in the Reserve Fund to the level of 
deposits is acceptable, the entire section will have to be re-
written and no distinction would be necessary to make, for the 
purposes of this section, between locally controlled and foreign 
banks except that for foreign banks the stipulated transfer will 
apply to net profits before deduction of head office expenses 
and remittance of profits. 
I 
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63. Also, there appears to be a case lor iowsring the per Cf i.r 
of net profits to be transferred annually to reserve fund. 
Section 
64. It is suggested that the word "or" be added after "banks 
and" and befoie "credit institutions" so that the Minister can 
fix separate amounts for the two types of institutions. 
New Section; 
65. This new section, it is suggested, 1-e adciad after Section 
9 empowering "the Minister to determine the mini muta ratio tljat 
after the expiry of six months from the date: of service of a 
notice to that effect, the assets of the territory held by the 
banks and/or credit institutions wili bear to thjir respective 
liabilities in the territory? however any variation made in 
such ratio shall not exceed 10 percentage points in any one 
period of six months» 
66. Subsequent sections will have to be re-numbered» 
Section 11 ; 
67» As it stands, this section imposes the same prohibitions 
on the banks and credit institutions with respect to trade 
investments and immovable property. This, it is felt, will 
operate harshly on the credit institutions. 
68. The prohibition in subsection (l) on trade may however 
apply to both types of institutions. But the term "at the 
earliest moment" should be made more definite by setting a 
time limit for the disposal of assets acquired in the 
satisfaction of debts with the power to the Minister to extend 
the period where he is duly aatisfied that the extension is 
jus tifiedo 
69» The prohibition, as it stands, on the acquisition of the 
share capital, it is felt, might not serve the developmental 
interests of the territories. The qualifying provision whereby 
the prohibition will not apply to shareholdings approved by 
the Minister no doubt recognizes the developmental view point 
but the provision will still remain overly restrictive. 
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70. It is for consideration that the preserst subsection (b) be 
replaced by a nexv subsection/s whereby 
i) dealings in the shares of the bank or credit institution 
itself are prohibited; 
ii) dealings in the shares of companies in which the directors 
individually or collectively of the bank or credit 
institution itself hold more than, say, 20^ of the 
equity capital are restricted, (not completely prohibited) 
by stipulating that the bank or credit institution (vill 
not hold at any time shares of any such company in excess 
of, say, lOfe of such company's paid-up equity share capital; 
iii) déalings i:o the shares of other companies be made subject 
to the overall ceiling, applying to all shareholdings, 
including those mentioned in (ii) above, namely that (a) 
a bank will hold not more than, say, 15^ of its deposits 
in shares according to their current market valuation and 
(b) a credit institution will hold not more than, say, 
30^ of its deposits in shares according to their current 
market valuation. 
The exception provided for in this scction, whereby the prohibitions 
or restrictions of the section will not apply to shareholdings approved 
by the Minister, could still be retained however. 
71. As regards the purchase or acquisition of immovable property, 
i 
it is again for consideration if this should not apply only to banks 
in its present form. For credit institutions, a ceiling might be set in 
terms of a proportion of their respective deposit liabilities. In 
either case, however, a time limit should be set for the disposal of 
property acquired in satisfaction of debts. 
Section 21: 
72. In addition to the requirement of an advance notice for six 
months for closing of business it may be stipulated, as a safeguard, 
that arrangements for meeting its obligations to the depositors ' 
shall be made to the satisfaction of the Minister, 
Section 2 6 ; 
73» The same provisions for disqualification should, it is felt, be 






74o A provision could also be made prohibiting a bank from using 
either of the words 'central' or 'reserve' in its name. 
Section 41s 
75» The provision requires to be strengthened on the lines 
Í indicated in Part II of this Note to give the Minister the 
power "to impose controls in respect of the volume, terms and 
M. 
conditions upon which credit may be made available to all or 
any sector of the economy". 
oOo^ 
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